The discussion is going along predictably and with some good points (like whitelisting isn’t practical), but at the 17:45 minute mark, the odd statement is made the heuristics and behavioral detections don’t work.
This statement directly contradicts fact.
Many of the leading AV engines are, in fact, relying heavily on generic detections and heuristics (some that come to mind include Sophos, Avira, Symantec, and one of the great users of heuristics, ESET). Go ahead and grab a piece of malware, submit it to Virustotal, and see how many detections are things like “trojan.gen”, “delphi.gen”, “troj.heur.downloader”, or “trojan.packed.gen” . These are generic or heuristic detections. And there’s a lot of them.
As far as I’m concerned, just about the only thing an AV company can do these days is to lean heavily on heuristics or behavioral detections. When you’re processing over 30,000 pieces of malware daily, there’s not much choice.
We’re certainly pushing in that direction. As an example, some preliminary test results of our upcoming MX-V virtualization technology (which is almost purely behavioral) are showing detections of almost a quarter of our entire malware repository. That’s pretty powerful, and this is a behavioral system. There are no signficant issues with false positives, either.
Similarly lambasted in the video is Host Intrusion Prevention (HIPS). Well, it’s not very relevant in a 64–bit world, but in a 32–bit world, one thing HIPS can do is block an attempt by an application to write to a place in memory where it’s not supposed to (a buffer overflow). Seems like a good idea to me. Or IDS, which relies on rules that are the writer’s best approximation of a means to detect a certain type of network event.
As my good friend Randy Abrams over at ESET said:
I invite the curious to spend some time in an AV lab. Fair warning, however: As in legislation and sausages, you might not want to watch the process.